

## Message Text

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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5862  
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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
ALL NATO CAPITALS  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NATO 08795

BELGRADE FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: CSCE, NATO  
SUBJECT: CSCE/CMBS - POLADS DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE  
ALLIED MOVEMENTS POSITION

REFS: (A) STATE 19738Z DTG 1900417 AUG 77, (B) STATE  
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SUMMARY: DURING THE SEPTEMBER 13 POLADS MEETING ON CBMS,  
ALLIED REPS COMMENDED THE US PAPER ON MOVEMENTS CBM AND  
PROVIDED A RANGE OF COMMENTS WHICH TENDED GENERALLY TO  
FAVO OPTION II. NOTING THAT LONDON FOUND THE US PAPER  
AND OPTIONS TOO DETAILED, UK REP OFFERED TWO ADDITIONAL  
OPTIONS FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION. WE BELIEVE THE  
DISCUSSION POINTED UP NEED FOR EXTENSIVE FURTHER POLADS  
WORK ON MOVEMENT CBMS IN PREPARATION FOR BELGRADE, AND  
THAT THE BASIC NATO PAPERS ON CBMS (ISD 149 AND 156)  
SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE COUNCIL FOR APPROVAL WITH A  
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NOTATION THAT POLADS ARE CONTINUING WORK ON MOVEMENTS  
CBM. END SUMMARY. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARA 17.

1. ALLIED REPS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTED  
COMMENTS ON THE US PAPER ON POSSIBLE MOVEMENTS CBM.

2. NORWEGIAN REP WELCOMED AND COMMENDED US PAPER, WHICH  
SHOWED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP MOVEMENTS CBMS THAT

HAVE NO NEGATIVE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS. PRELIMINARY NORWEGIAN REACTION WAS THAT WHILE NONE OF THE THREE OPTIONS POSE DIFFICULTIES, THEY DO NOT ENTIRELY TAKE CARE OF THE MOVEMENTS PROBLEM IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL REGION OF NORWAY. NORWEGIANS FAVOR OPTION II, BUT WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF ELABORATING THE LANGUAGE SUGGESTED BY THE US. IN THIS REGARD THE NORWEGIANS WOULD APPRECIATE US VIEWS ON WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE (A) TO LOWER THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION TO 10,000 TROOPS, (B) TO NOTIFY MOVEMENTS INTO THE APPLICABLE AREA REGARDLESS OF THE DISTANCE OF THE MOVEMENTS, AN UNDERTAKING THE NORWEGIANS SUPPOSE WOULD NOT AFFECT ALLIED ALERT TESTS WITH FORCES IN THE AREA.

3. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES FAVORED US OPTION II BUT WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE VIABLE SINCE IT APPEARED NOT TO CONSTRAIN THE ALLIES VERY MUCH.

4. CANADIAN REP SAID OTTAWA WELCOMED THE US CONTRIBUTION AND WAS PLEASED THE US HAD MADE SUCH A SERIOUS EFFORT TO DEVELOP CBMS OPTIONS FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION. CANADIANS BELIEVED THE PAPER DESERVES CAREFUL STUDY. UNDERLYING THE US POSITION, IN THE CANADIAN VIEW, IS THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WHAT THE ALLIES FEEL THE REAL PURPOSE OF A MOVEMENT CBMS SHOULD BE. ON FIRST READING, THE US PAPER SEEMED TO FOCUS EXTENSIVELY ON USING MOVEMENT NOTIFICATIONS  
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AS A MEANS OF CONSTRAINING THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WARSAW PACT, RATHER THAN ON LONG-TERM POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ENCOURAGING GREATER OPENNESS IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE CANADIANS SEE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO APPROACHES AS NOT MERELY ACADEMIC, BECAUSE THE FORMER LEADS TOWARD HIGHLY PRECISE AND WELL-DEFINED CBMS, WHEREAS THE LATTER COULD LEAD TOWARD DECLARATIONS OF INTENT OF A LESS EXPLICIT NATURE. CANADIANS BELIEVE IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR THE ALLIES TO RECONSIDER THEIR FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN THE CBMS FIELD.

5. FRENCH REP EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE POSITION OR SCEPTICISM OF HER AUTHORITIES REGARDING CBMS PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE AND THAT FRANCE WAS UNLIKELY TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH INITIATIVES IN THIS FIELD.

6. FRG REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES PREFERRED THE SECOND US OPTION, BUT WOULD SUGGEST DELETING FROM THE LANGUAGE SUGGESTED BY THE US THE PHRASE "IF SUCH TROOPS ARE MOVED FOR A COORDINATED PURPOSE", WHICH STRUCK THE FRG AS TOO VAGUE DESPITE THE US EXPLANATION. THE FRG WOULD ALSO DELETE THE PHRASE "OR ACROSS AN INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER", WHICH THE FRG BELIEVED COULD IMPINGE MORE HEAVILY ON THE

ALLIES THAN ON THE WP.

7. ITALIAN REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES PREFERRED OPTION II, BUT WOULD WISH IT MADE CLEAR THAT NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT APPLY TO MOVEMENTS CONNECTED WITH INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS. THE ITALIANS WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH US OPTION III.

8. TURKISH REP SAID ANKARA WELCOMED THE US PAPER, BUT IN VIEW OF ITS COMPLEXITY, WOULD NEED MORE TIME BEFORE PROVIDING DETAILED COMMENT.

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9. UK REP SAID THE US WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE ADVOCACY OF THE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS IS VERY WELCOME, BUT THE US PAPER SEEMS RATHER CONVOLUTED. THE TEXTS CONTAINED IN IT ARE IN THE UK VIEW TOO DETAILED TO BE APPROPRIATE FOR USE AT BELGRADE. THE UK'S OWN APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A NOTIFICATION PROVISION ON MOVEMENTS IS THAT THE EXISTING CBM ON MANEUVERS PROVIDES A THRESHOLD AND A TIME-SCALE FOR NOTIFICATION AND OFFERS DEFINITIONS OF TROOPS, THE APPLICABLE AREA AND THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION TEXTS. THE UK BELIEVES IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ADOPT ALTERNATIVE PARAMETERS FOR MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE CONTRIVED AND DISCRIMINATORY, UNLESS THERE IS A COMPELLING REASON FOR DOING SO. THE UK BELIEVES THAT IN GENERAL THE PARAMETERS SET OUT FOR MANEUVERS IN THE FINAL ACT, AMENDED

OR SUPPLEMENTED BY WHATEVER IS AGREED AT BELGRADE, CAN APPROPRIATELY BE READ ACROSS TO A PROVISION ON MOVEMENTS. THE UK SEES NO NEED TO SPELL OUT ALL THE DETAILS AGAIN AND NO POINT IN TRYING TO CATER IN A MOVEMENTS CBM TO EVERY HYPOTHETICAL EVENTUALITY: THE TEXT ON MANEUVERS

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AGREED AT HELSINKI STILL LEFT CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES, WHICH COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY PRACTICE AND INTERPRETATION AND THE SAME WILL APPLY TO ANYTHING THAT CAN BE AGREED ON MOVEMENTS.

10. THE UK REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT, AS REGARDS TEXTS ON MOVEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A RESOLUTION ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE CONSIDERED:

(A) "NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN OF GROUND FORCE MILITARY MOVEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS IN THE SAME MANNER AS, AND APPLYING MUTATIS MUTANDIS THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS FOR THOSE MANEUVERS"; OR

(B) "NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN THE SAME MANNER AS AND APPLYING MUTATIS MUTANDIS THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS FOR MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS. IN THIS CONTEXT A MAJOR GROUND FORCE MILITARY MOVEMENT IS DEFINED AS THE TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OR REPLACEMENT AT ANY TIME WITHIN 30 CONSECUTIVE DAYS OF BEGIN BRACKET 10,000/25,000 END BRACKET OR MORE TROOPS WHETHER IN UNIT FORMATIONS OR NOT."

UK REP NOTED THAT THE FIRST OF THESE TEXTS, CORRESPONDING TO THE US OPTION I, WOULD BE VERY MUCH A FALL-BACK SINCE IT WOULD ADD VIRTUALLY NOTHING TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED. THE SECOND TEXT, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, IS WHAT THE UK HOPES TO SEE ACCEPTED AT BELGRADE. LONDON RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS AND MIGHT BE THOUGHT TO LEAVE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS UNANSWERED. BUT THE UK BELIEVES THAT IT IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AS TO PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY GUIDE FOR ACTION. THE UK DOES NOT THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TRY TO INTRODUCE INTO THE

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TEXT, AS THE US HAS DONE IN ITS OPTIONS II AND III, CONTRIVED DEFINITIONS OF THE THRESHOLD, PARTICULARLY IN WAYS THAT ARE OBVIOUSLY DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE UK WOULD NOT ITSELF WANT TO INTRODUCE

ADDITIONAL NOTIONS SUCH AS THE CROSSING OF INTERNATIONAL BORDERS. THE FIGURE FOR THE NUMBER OF TROOPS HAS BEEN LEFT IN SQUARE BRACKETS SINCE THE UK ASSUMES THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO EQUATE IT TO WHATEVER HAD BEEN AGREED, OR SEEMED LIKELY TO BE AGREED, FOR MANEUVERS. THE UK PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A FIGURE OF 10,000, BUT THE UK RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE ATTAINABLE.

11. IMS REP WELCOMED THE US PAPER AS THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW PROVIDED TO THE ALLIES OF THE PARAMETERS OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENTS CBM. THE IMS FOUND THE US ANALYSIS VERY SOUND. OPTION I WOULD BE MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE. OPTION II WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE APPLICABLE IN CRISIS AND WOULD NOT BE OPERATIONALLY INHIBITING IN NORMAL TIMES. OPTION III GAVE RISE TO SUBSTANTIAL MISGIVING AND SHOULD BE DROPPED.

12. POLADS' DISCUSSION OF US PAPER TOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A REVIEW OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH ON MOVEMENTS, NOW IN BRACKETS, OF ISD 156. BELGIAN, NORWEGIAN, AND DUTCH REPS WISHED TO REMOVED BRACKETS AND RETAIN THIS PARA IN VERSION OF PAPER THAT WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL FOR USE IN BELGRADE. DUTCH REP SUGGESTED DELETING FROM THIS PARA THE PHRASE "IN PARTICULAR THOSE MOVEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY MANEUVERS". TURKISH REP STRONGLY PREFERRED INCLUDING THE FINAL PARA ON MOVEMENTS IN ISD 156, TOGETHER WITH ALL THE OPTIONS SUGGESTED BY THE US AND UK. DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT ONLY TURKS AND NORWEGIANS WANT TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON MOVEMENTS IN AN ALLIED CBMS RESOLUTION AT BELGRADE, WHILE OTHERS FAVORED REACTING TO

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NNA PROPOSALS OR MAKING DECISION IN LIGHT OF TACTICAL SITUATION.

13. US REP DREW FULLY ON PARA 3A REF B, INCLUDING THE SUGGESTION THAT IN OFFERING THE ALLIED DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CBMS AT BELGRADE, THE ALLIES MIGHT SIMPLY NOTE THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT AN APPROPRIATELY FORMULATED OBLIGATION ON MOVEMENTS, AND THAT ALLIES WOULD THEN MAKE USE OF DETAILED MOVEMENT FORMULATIONS AS DISCUSSIONS PROCEED.

14. SOME REPS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT PROMPT THE NNAS TO PRESS THE ALLIES IMMEDIATELY TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL, WHICH COULD BE AWKWARD IF THE ALLIES HAD NOT REACHED PRIOR AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE.

15. THIS DISCUSSION DOVETAILED WITH CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO HANDLE ISD 149, 156, AND THE US PAPER ON MOVEMENTS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ISD 156 WHICH WAS MODIFIED ONLY SLIGHTLY DURING POLADS DISCUSSION (REPORTED SEPTTEL), SHOULD BE APPENDED TO ISD 149 AND FORWARDED TO CONFIDENTIAL

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THE COUNCIL, IF POSSIBLE BY SEPTEMBER 28, SO THAT IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN BELGRADE IN TIME FOR THE MAIN MEETING. PER PARA 8 REF B, US REP SAID THAT IN THE INTEREST OF HAVING A COORDINATED ALLIED APPROACH, WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE US MOVEMENTS PAPER, WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES, APPENDED TO ISD 149 AS AN ALLIED PAPER. UK REP, SUPPORTED BY OTHERS, SAW NO PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A PAPER ALONG THE LINES OF THAT PROVIDED BY THE US IN TIME FOR BELGRADE. DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WAS INCONCLUSIVE, BUT IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS WITH THE IS AND INTERESTED POLADS, MOST AGREED THAT IN VIEW OF THE NEED FOR FURTHER WORK ON MOVEMENTS CBMS, THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO PREPARE FOR APPROVAL BY THE COUNCIL, ISD 149, WITH 156 AS AN ANNEX WITHOUT CBMS MOVEMENT LANGUAGE OR OPTIONS BUT WITH NOTATION THAT POLADS WERE CONTINUING WORK ON MOVEMENTS CBMS.

16. COMMENT: WE INTEND TO SUPPORT THIS PROCEDURAL SOLUTION AT RESUMED POLADS' MEETING ON CMBS SEPTEMBER 15. IT SEEMS TO US THE BEST COURSE SINCE IT WOULD NOT DELAY PROVIDING TO ALLIED DELEGATIONS AT BELGRADE A BASIC ALLIED PAPER AND RESOLUTION ON CBMS. IT WOULD AVOID THE POSSIBLE CONFUSION OF FORWARDING BRACKETED CMBS MOVEMENTS OPTIONS ON WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE NOT YET AGREED AND ON WHICH FURTHER WORK WILL BE REQUIRED. WITH OTHER PREPARATIONS

FOR BELGRADE COMPLETED, POLADS WILL BE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE  
ON MOVEMENT CBMS IN COMING WEEKS. WE ARE PRESSING THOSE  
ALLIES THAT HAVE NOT YET DONE SO TO PROVIDE DETAILED  
COMMENTS ON THE US PAPER.

17. ACTION REQUESTED: AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, WASHINGTON'S  
REACTION TO ALLIED COMMENTS ABOVE. BENNETT

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